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INTRODUCTION

W

HAT does Brown mean today? To answer that question, we must address
the Court's recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger' within the framework
of the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence more generally. Brown, of course,
held that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," 2 that is, that
"segregation of [minority] children in public schools," deprives them of "equal
educational opportunities."3 Contained within Brown was the promise of
integration. The promise was that by eliminating de jure segregation, the
architecture of white subordination could be made to crumble, and that all
Americans, through enhanced intergroup and interpersonal contact, would become
more fully equipped to meet the challenges of a complex and ever-changing modern
society.
But if we look at the wide sweep of the Brown implementation cases we see,
instead, a Court that was never able to come to terms with Brown's promise. 4 The
reality is that the Supreme Court has simply withdrawn from the continuing and
extraordinarily difficult problem of desegregating the public schools on the K-12
level. 5 Today, K-12 school segregation is on the rise,6 and "desegregation" has
become part of a bygone era. Quite simply, the Supreme Court has moved on. So
to the extent that Brown survives in any real way today, it does so through the force
of the idea it championed-which was the importance ofracial integration-rather
than because it stands for any firm and incontrovertible mandate that secondary
schools must be desegregated.
*

Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
3. Id. at 493.
4. Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence ofIntegration Past, Present, and Future
47 HOWARD L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
5. Erwin Chemerinsky, Courts Must Share the Blame for the Failure to Desegregate Public
Schools 3 0-3 8, available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg02/chemerinsky
.pdf(Aug. 15, 2002).
6. See Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee & Gary Orfield,A Multiracial Society with Segregated
Schools:
Are
We
Losing the
Dream?
4-6,
available
at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreW eLosingtbeDream. pdf (Jan. 16,
2003).
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Now consider the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence. Prior to
Grutter, the Court's most recent pronouncements on affirmative action fell into two
general categories: cases having to do with the use of racial preferences in meting
out an employment benefit or opportunity, and cases dealing with the use of race
in structuring electoral districts in the voting rights context. 7 In both of these areas,
the Court suggested that racial preferences assisting minority group members were
unlikely to pass constitutional muster. 8 Yet in Grutter, the Court not only allows
racial preferences to be used in a manner that burdened white applicants to the
University of Michigan Law School, but does so with some enthusiasm. 9 Thus, a
well-informed observer might marvel at the Court's pronouncement in Grutter
given its abandonment of the demands of K-12 desegregation and its professed
"skepticism" with respect to all racial classification schemes, whether benign or
invidious. 10
Given all of this, how does one explain Grutter? One answer is that Grutter is
this generation's Brown, presenting a "solution" to the terribly difficult and divisive
racial question of our time, but through a method that simultaneously cleaves to
high ideal, while recoiling from specificity with respect to enforcement. In this
way, Grutter mimics Brown, following its methodology and accepting the propriety
ofits overriding theme. In Grutter, as in Brown, the Court: (1) accepted rather than
denied that there was a deeply divisive and enduring social problem at issue;
(2) found a way to "solve" that problem through a resort to "high ideals" affecting
society as a whole rather than just minority group members; and finally
(3) distanced itself from the actual machinations of how diversity would be
implemented. 11
Understanding Grutter from this perspective also helps to explain the seeming
disconnect between the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence and
Grutter' s outcome. At first blush, Grutter appears to be a deviation from the body
of the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence: it says "yes" where the other
cases said "no." But it is not so clear that Grutter is a deviation from current law.
Instead, it might be seen as consistent with it, in that the justification for the racial
preference recognized in Grutter transcended the justifications offered in the
previous cases, and the method used to achieve that end, "race as a factor," diffused
rather than highlighted race. From this perspective, Grutter addressed several
concerns that had troubled the Court for many years, reorientating the affirmative
action problem away from explicitly addressing the harms experienced by minority
group members toward a more prospective orientation which asks: what's best for
the country moving forward? Grutter thus answered the question of how it might
be possible to sustain an affirmative action plan once it was clear that strict scrutiny
applied. The answer is by reliance on the same underlying rationale that was
recognized in Brown: the importance ofracial integration to American society.

7. See infra part II.

8. See id.
9. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-41.
10. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-224 (1995).
11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-42 (2003).
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Thus, Grutter might be understood as this generation's Brown v. Board of
Education because it managed to reinvigorate the judicial commitment to
affirmative action (which is after all the preeminent civil rights policy of our time)
by a clear commitment to the same abstract principle that commanded the Court in
Brown: racial integration. At the same time, the Grutter Court used essentially the
same analytical process--commitment to high ideal, refrain from detail-that was
favored in Brown. Both cases, then, are examples of equal protection jurisprudence
on the level of high theory. The animating rationale in each is an abiding belief in
the importance of race mixing or diversity for society's sake. They are both
prospective, rather than retrospective decisions. But, of course, if this is true, the
question that remains to be answered, particularly given the Grutter Court's twentyfive year "phase out" reference, 12 is whether the same pattern that obtained after
Brown will be repeated: invocation of high and deeply important principle,judicial
inattention, articulation of a more detailed enforcement framework, and then
ultimately retreat.
I. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND RACIAL INTEGRATION

Brown v. Board of Education, of course, was the culmination of a lengthy and
protracted litigation strategy which sought to destroy de Jure segregation in all
phases of American life. 13 The strategy was incremental, and by the time the Brown
litigation reached the Supreme Court, the Court was finally prepared to deal with
a vexing and highly contested issue: the propriety of state-mandated segregation in
American public schools. 14 The background and facts of the Brown decision are
quite well known. 15 The case challenged de Jure segregation in four states on the
theory that "segregated public schools are not 'equal' and cannot be made 'equal,"'
and thus were a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 16
The Court agreed and ruled that "in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place." 17
The significance of Brown is difficult to overestimate. However, it is important
to remember that in Brown the Court was only prepared to go so far. Brown I
confined itself to the field of public secondary education and did not even reach the
question of the appropriate remedy for the harm that it had defined. The larger
question of the propriety of de Jure segregation in other phases of American life
would have to wait until a later date. How did the Brown Court go about "solving"
the incredibly divisive issue of state-mandated segregation in the public schools?
It articulated constitutional principle as high ideal, and that ideal was racial
integration.

12. Id. at 342.
13. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE ( 1977) (outlining the history of Brown v.
Bd. of Educ.).
14. MARK C. TuSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THuRGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 1936-1961, at 203-04 (1994).
15. See generally KLUGER, supra note 13.
16. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
17. Id. at 495.
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Elsewhere I have suggested that Brown articulated a v1S1onary notion of
integration that was comprised of two major components: the "minority access"
perspective and the "diversity" perspective. 18 On the one hand, Brown could be
seen from a rights-based or rights-granting perspective as providing minority group
members with access to white-dominated institutions, such as southern public
schools. On this view, Brown's desegregation mandate arises from the
understanding that the "only way to undo the myriad harms created by stateimposed segregation is to disestablish the architecture of subordination that defined
that system." 19 Thus, Brown from the "minority access" perspective stood for the
proposition that integration was the appropriate remedy for state-mandated
segregation's victims, given the significance of the harm. Brown also articulated
a second, independent rationale for the desegregation mandate that is of particular
import for our discussion here: the "diversity" perspective. 20 In Brown, the Court
recognized that integration had a significant and independent value outside of the
opportunities created for minority group members through the process of
desegregation. This was the case because of the intimate relationship among
education, democracy, and citizenship.21
The Brown Court's ruling hinged on the significance of education in American
public life, thus the Court's statement that education was perhaps the "most
important function of state and local govemments."22 Because education
established the foundation of good citizenship, enhanced stable values, and
provided the child with a foundation for further professional study in later life, it
had to be provided to all on equal terms. 23 Thus, black children could not be
deprived of an equal education, because education was so important to the
development and later success of the individual as a person and as a member of
society. 24
The opinion also traced the source of the Equal Protection Clause violation to the
importance education plays in the lives of all Americans. 25 The Court suggested
that the importance of the requirement that all children be provided with an equal
educational opportunity transcended the specific needs of black children. The Court
particularly emphasized the relationship between education and our social and
political system. 26 While children lacking access to equal educational opportunities
might well be deprived of an important social good, society would also be positively
benefited by the presence of children possessing the ability to become good and
useful citizens, holding values consistent with those of the larger society: thus
leading to the Court's observation that "education is the very foundation of good
citizenship," and the Court's emphasis on the relationship between education,

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Adams, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
Id.
See Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
See id.
See id.
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cultural values, and normal adjustment. 27 This, then, was the diversity perspective:
American society on the whole benefits when all children have equal access to
educational opportunities.
In providing a solution to one of the most vexing social and political issues of
that day (or any other), Brown spoke in the language of abstract principle, endorsing
racial integration as a beneficial aim, but shying away from the thorny realities of
its implementation. This, of course, was borne out by the fact that in Brown I the
Court failed to reach the question of remedy. 28 Similarly, in Brown II, which has
been amply and justifiably criticized, the Court issued a vague mandate which
simultaneously appeased Southern recalcitrance and shifted the burden of
implementation of that mandate to the lower federal courts. 29 Brown II revealed the
Court's disengagement from the realities of implementing Brown I's mandate. The
Court's deep-seated ambiguity set the stage for later judicial developments which
have resulted in, at best, only a partial fulfillment of Brown I's promise.
Combined with Brown's mandate that (at least in theory) students of different
backgrounds would attend the same schools, Brown from the diversity perspective
envisioned an American society that the Grutter Court inherited almost fifty years
later. This vision suggested that American society could be improved through racial
integration; that both blacks and whites stood to benefit from enhanced and
sustained contact and the "spillover" effects of race-mixing. This vision, however,
was articulated in the most abstract and thus most appealing terms: education,
democracy, citizenship, and values. It is this vision which Grutter v. Bollinger
shares.

II.

SITUATING GR UTTER WITHIN RECENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOCTRINE

In order to understand how Grutter v. Bollinger might be seen as this generation's
Brown v. Board of Education, it is necessary to situate the Grutter case within
recent affirmative action doctrine. Grutter surprised a great many in the civil rights
community, along with Court-watchers generally. 30 That surprise was due at the
least in part to the fact that Grutter differed significantly in both outcome and the
language and reasoning used to reach that result from the Court's recent affirmative
action decisions. 31 The outcome in Gratz v. Bollinger3 2 notwithstanding, Grutter
has delighted as many advocates of affirmative action as it has angered its

27. Id.
28. See id. at 495.
29. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 13 (outlining the history of Brown).
30. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, On Grutter and Gratz: Examining "Diversity in Education," 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622-23 (2003).
31. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.Pena,515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993); Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986).
32. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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opponents. 33 I suggest that one way to understand Grutter is that it solves some of
the problems suggested in the earlier affirmative action cases.
One question is why the difference in outcomes in Grutter and cases like Wygant
v. Jackson Board ofEducation, 34 Richmond v. Croson, 35 Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 36 and Shaw v. Reno?37 If, in fact, all racial classification schemes are
'"simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between
justification and classification,"'38 what is it about the use ofrace in Grutter that
allayed the Court's skepticism about racial classifications? And what is it about the
use of race in the employment and voting rights contexts that confirmed those
suspicions?
One could take a variety of approaches in answering this question. One might
probe the use of strict scrutiny in each context and search for differences in the
test's application. One might fixate on the different styles and philosophy of each
opinion's author (which is very tempting given the fact that Justice O'Connor is the
author of the majority opinion in so many of the affirmative action cases). Or one
might attempt to situate each opinion in its particular timeframe and ask, were the
executive and legislative branches dominated by Democrats or Republicans at the
time the opinion was decided? Was the civil rights community better or less well
organized at a particular point in time? What role did amicus briefs and other types
of organizing play in influencing the Court?
These are all valid and important approaches to answering the question. But I
approach the question from another perspective: I ask not just how is voting
different from employment, or how is higher education unique, but what larger
values are promoted or protected in each context mentioned. I also ask how are
those values secured? Does the process used to achieve racial diversity highlight
racial differences, or does it seek to downplay and obscure them? Ultimately, I
suggest there is a relationship between the answers to these questions and our
current understanding of Brown v. Board ofEducation.

A.

Intergroup Competition for Jobs and Employment Opportunities

The Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence in the employment context39
has taken place in the context of fierce competition between members of racially
33. See, e.g., Jeremy Berkowitz & Tomislav Ladika, Supreme Court Upholds Affirmative Action,
Rejects Point System, MICH. DAILY, June 24, 2003, available atwww.michigandaily.com ("Civil rights
leaders and University officials ... express[ ed] their delight. .... But recent University graduate James
Justin Wilson ... [said] 'This is the worst decision .... "').
34. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that the school board's use of race for giving preferential
treatment in layoffs was unconstitutional).
35. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) {holding percentage of subcontractor contracts based on used of
minorities was unconstitutional).
36. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding racial classifications needed to meet strict scrutiny).
37. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding North Carolina's redistricting plan unconstitutional on the
basis ofracial motivations).
38. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
39. I define "employment" broadly to include racial classifications that impact individuals on the
job as well as those classifications that might have some impact on the ability to obtain contracts in a
competitive bidding environment. Either way, the use of the racial classification alters either an
existing or potential employment opportunity.
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defined groups for jobs and other employment oppmiunities. In the context of this
competition, the Court has been called upon to determine whether racial preferences
could be used to "even the playing field" for new entrants into particular
employment markets. Wygantv. Jackson Board ofEducation, Richmondv. Croson,
andAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena demonstrate the Court's refusal to interfere
in the employment context and disrupt the "natural" mechanizations of the market,
and its propensity to accept rather than deny the ongoing and pervasive nature of
racial discrimination in those markets. The employment cases, by their very nature,
required the Court to take a position on the influence of the past on the present and
to weigh and balance the propriety of racial preferences against that background.
Ultimately, the interests put forward by the government to justify the use of racial
preferences, which necessarily required recognition of the continuing effect of past
discrimination, were simply not significant enough to justify those preferences.
1.

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Prior to 1953, no black teachers had been employed in the Jackson public
schools. 40 By the early 1970's, the situation had improved somewhat, but the
number of black children attending the Jackson public schools far exceeded the
number of black teachers. 41 At the same time, Jackson public school teachers were
polled with respect to their views on the then existing layoff policy, and the vast
majority favored the extant policy, which mandated that teachers be laid off on a
straight seniority basis should termination become necessary. 42
In 1972, contract renegotiations coincided with an outbreak of racial violence in
the Jackson school system. 43 That same year, the Jackson Education Association,
the Jackson school teachers' collective bargaining unit, ratified a contract that
explicitly recognized "the desirability of multi-ethnic representation on the teaching
faculty," and sought as a goal that the percentage of minority faculty match that of
the student population. 44 Thus, under the newly adopted agreement, white teachers
with more seniority could be laid off before minority teachers with fewer years on
the job. 45 The theory animating the preference was that minority teachers were
instrumental in providing something very important to their students. As the district
court below put it, "minority teachers are role models for minority students. This
is vitally important because societal discrimination has often deprived minority
children of other role-models." 46
In Wygant, the Supreme Court rejected the district court's ruling upholding the
collective bargaining agreement against challenge by laid off white teachers with
more seniority. 47 In a plurality decision, Justice Powell ruled that the appropriate

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 120 I.
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,273 (1986).
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standard of review was strict scrutiny. 48 "Strict scrutiny," of course, requires the
government actor seeking to justify its affirmative action plan to demonstrate that
the plan is animated by a "compelling governmental interest" and that that interest
is "narrowly tailored" to achieve the government's objective.49
Justice Powell ruled that the layoff plan was not supported by a compelling
interest: ameliorating the effects of societal discrimination by providing minority
"role models" was simply insufficient, and any argument that the layoff plan was
an appropriate remedy for the Board's prior discrimination also failed because there
was an inadequate evidentiary basis upon which to support that conclusion. 50
Key to Justice Powell's decision was the narrow tailoring analysis. In Wygant,
the Court ruled that the layoff plan was not "narrowly tailored" to achieve the
interest ofremediating past discrimination. 51 In this portion of the decision, Justice
Powell emphasized the impact of a layoff scheme on "innocent" parties; white
teachers with more seniority were clearly and unambiguously injured under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 52 From Justice Powell's perspective,
hiring goals were much preferred because they were more "diffuse," spreading the
costs of achieving the affirmative action plan's goals "among society generally."53
From this perspective, one might see Wygant as a case that protected the interests
of the laid off white teachers as against those of the more newly hired black faculty.
Of course, the interests of those white teachers had presumably been protected by
their collective bargaining unit. The problem was as "victims" of the new layoff
policy, they now sought to renegotiate the outcome of that bargain. On this view,
Wygant is a case about competition between racial groups in the employment
context where there was a significant prize at issue. Black faculty were new
entrants into the competitive market for teachers in the Jackson public schools.
They had been kept out of that market for a long period of time because of racial
discrimination.54 The jobs at issue were good union jobs that typically offer job
security, health care, some expectation of enhanced salary overtime, some level of
prestige, protection with respect to work duties and hours, and some level of work
time flexibility (i.e., relatively free summers, perhaps shorter hours).
The upshot of Justice Powell's decision is that the desire to ameliorate societal
discrimination by providing effective "role models" for black students in the
Jackson public school system was not significant enough to justify clearly and
unambiguously harming those who the Court viewed as "innocent victims" of a

48. Id. at 273-74.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 274-79.
51. Id. at 283-84.
52. See id. at 282.
53. Id. at 282-83. As Justice Powell put it, "[l]ayoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way
that general hiring goals do not." Id. at 283.
54. The Board, of course, had attempted to argue that it had engaged in employment
discrimination in order to justify the layoff plan, but Justice Powell rejected this attempt because there
had never been any judicial finding of employment discrimination against the Jackson School Board.
Id. at 277-78. There was, however, no dispute in the case, that the lack of black teachers before 1953
and the relatively small number of black faculty in the Jackson schools at the time of the adoption of
the collective bargaining unit would be attributed to "societal discrimination." See id. at 276.
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misguided collective bargaining agreement. The desire to ameliorate societal
discrimination has at least two problems.
First, allowing societal discrimination to form the basis of a compelling interest
that might insulate an affirmative action plan from constitutional attack requires
accepting the fact of the ubiquitousness of discrimination and the profound
disadvantage and exclusion visited upon blacks until extremely recently. The
previous de Jure discriminatory regime was of such a magnitude, so allencompassing, as to occasion disbelief from the more modern observant. Instead,
the reaction from many well-adjusted, forward-thinking individuals is simply to
ignore the sweep of the previous discriminatory system. The problem is just so
enormous that the tendency is to deny it. Thus, the acceptance of the societal
discrimination compelling interest requires a rejection of the desire to deny.
Second, if the societal discrimination compelling interest requires acceptance of
an enormous social problem, the "role model" rationale seems too insignificant to
justify so clearly "harming" innocent individuals. In the context of what I suggest
was a competitive problem, it seems incongruent to determine the winner of a
contest between two groups for societal benefits by suggesting that one group can
provide marginally better psychological outcomes to the consumers of the services
whom members of either group could adequately serve. To the extent that one
views K-12 education as primarily centered on the transfer of knowledge and
information (as distinct from the development of the individual outside of
knowledge transfer or as having significant spillover effects in other areas), the role
model justification simply is not important enough to justify departure from the
norm. As I suggest below, I think the Grutter Court perceived education differently
than the Wygant Comi.
2.

Richmond v. Croson and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Remediating
Competitive Disputes Arising.from the Present Effects ofPast Discriminatory
Conduct

Richmond v. Croson and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena both concerned
affirmative action plans that attempted to "even the playing field" for competitive
bidding opportunities. In both cases, the governmental actor tried to justify its
affirmative action plan as an attempt to remediate the present effects of past
discriminatory conduct. I suggest that, as was the case in Wygant, there are
powerful disincentives militating against recognizing the ongoing effects of prior
discrimination. It is useful to view the Croson/Adarand line of cases as consistent
with Wygant, that is, as primarily concerned with mediating intergroup competition.
Richmond v. Croson concerned the city of Richmond's affirmative action
program, which set aside 30% of all city contracts for minority business
enterprises. 55 Let us take a few steps back and focus on exactly what the Richmond
City Council was attempting to achieve with the set-aside program. At the time the
set-aside program was created, there were very few minority contractors in

55. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
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existence eligible to compete for city contracts; the reality was that the construction
industry in the surrounding area was completely white-dominated. 56
The council's rationale for the set-aside was to mitigate the effects of past
exclusionary practices on minority contractors. 57 The set-aside program was
intended to remedy the present effects of past discriminatory conduct that had
resulted in a very small percentage of minority members in area trade associations,
a small number of minority business enterprises involved in the construction trade,
and a small number of city contracts awarded to minority firms. 58 Thus, the
contracting program was an inclusionary mechanism created to disrupt patterns of
exclusion in the contracting industry. 59 One way oflooking at the set-aside program
is as a mechanism intended to "even the playing field" between white and minority
contractors. The set-aside thereby enhanced competition overall for city contracts
and reduced the benefits enjoyed by white contractors in the Richmond area that
had accrued through generations of past discriminatory activities.
Nevertheless, the Court struck the program down. 6° For the Court, the program
was problematic for several reasons; I want to focus here on just one. Justice
O'Connor, writing for a plurality, was particularly concerned about the fact that a·
majority of the Richmond city council was black. 61 The assertion was that the
Richmond set-aside program was more suspicious because the black "majority" was
advantaging itself at the expense of the white "minority," which has been injured
by the program. 62 The insinuation was that the set-aside program was simply part
of a political spoils system, which canceled out any honest attempt to rectify past
wrongs. This assertion also required one to believe that the white dominated
construction industry would cease to enjoy influence on the actions of the city
council because it was minority dominated.
But what I think is most important to note in thinking about the Richmond city
council's predicament, is the role the Court cast itself in. It is important to
remember that, at base, the dispute was between two contracting firms, one black
and one white, for a city plumbing contract. A lower bidding white contractor
challenged the set-aside plan arguing that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. 63
Thus, the question the Court was ultimately forced to answer centered on how to
mediate a competitive dispute between two parties for an economic benefit. Indeed,
the Court framed the issue in competitive terms, suggesting that "[t]he Richmond
Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of
public contracts based solely upon their race."64
The competitive perspective is important to keep in mind as we analyze how the
Court reached its conclusion. Croson, of course, rejected the notion that the "sorry
history of both private and public discrimination in this country" was relevant
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 480.
Id. at 537 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. at 543 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 470.
See id. at 495-96.
Id.
Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 493.
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absent a showing of "identified discrimination" on the part of either the
governmental entity or private actor that the governmental entity has aided or
abetted, for the purposes of justifying an affirmative action plan. 65 But, of course,
once the history of past discrimination (and its continuing effects) drops out, the
question then becomes: is it appropriate to allow a black dominated city council to
help its own? The removal of this history (or one might say denial), left the Court
to focus on contractual relationships, bidding requirements, and small business
capitalization. 66 The canvas was undeniably smaller, and the Court was no longer
deciding large and momentous social issues prospectively. Instead, the issues in the
case appeared to be localized, and perhaps even parochial. The Court was no longer
adjudicating a historic affirmative action case in the "former capital of the
Confederacy," 67 but was concerned about a parochial "payback" scheme engineered
by a local government so possessed of its own power that it even granted
preferences to Eskimos and Aleuts. 68
The same analysis is relevant to the issue in Adarand. Croson had suggested that
because of the unique role accorded to Congress under Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment, and the skepticism displayed towards states in Section 1 of the 14th
Amendment, perhaps the federal government might be better suited to "identify and
redress the effects of society-wide discrimination." 69 Perhaps it was inappropriate
for the black-dominated Richmond city council to create a set-aside program, but
it might be a different question altogether if the federal legislature, the most
representative branch of the federal government, made the same decision. 70
Adarand proved that supposition false.
At issue in Adarand was a federal program that provided a financial incentive to
general contractors working on federal contracts to subcontract part of the dollar
amount of the contract to "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." 71
Under the program, minority group members were presumed to be socially and
economically disadvantaged. 72 The Court ruled that all racial preferences whether
created by the state or federal government, whether benign or invidious, were to be
assessed under the same standard-strict scrutiny. 73 In so doing, Adarand
essentially incorporated the same level of searching judicial scrutiny that had been
applied in Croson to affirmative action plans created by the federal government.
As twin contracting cases, much of the analysis with respect to Croson is
applicable to Adarand as well. I would add the following observation to unify the
two cases. Both cases turn on the question of whether the government can justify
its affinnative action plan on the theory of remediating the present effects of past
discriminatory conduct. But, of course, evaluation of such a question requires the
Court to accept that such effects continue.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 499-500 (1989).
See id. at 509-11.
Id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. at 506.
Croson, 488 US. at 490.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-79 (1980).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,200 (1995).
See id.
Id. at 227.
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One possibility might be that the inequalities we observe between black and
whites today are largely caused by the present effects of past discriminatory
conduct. This was essentially Justice Marshall's position in Croson. 14 Another
possibility might be to presume that the inequalities we observe today have little or
nothing to do with the continuing effects of past discriminatory conduct, essentially
the theory that a significant amount of time has passed since the end of Jim Crow,
and there is no longer an unbroken chain of causation between past discrimination
and present inequality. 75 Finally, one might also take a position somewhere
between these two poles.
But no matter where one falls on the spectrum, it requires the evaluator to take
a position on the effects of the past on the present. That is, the "remediating [of]
the present effects of past discriminatory conduct" compelling interest requires the
judge to evaluate the demands of the equal protection clause from a historical
perspective. Such an analysis is inherently uncomfortable. This is the case because
by the very nature of the compelling interest itself, the decisionmaker is drawn into
an evaluation of conduct, mind-set, and culture that the judge might otherwise
prefer to deny. 76 Given this, the ability to arrive at a conclusion in such contentious
cases, which speaks prospectively as opposed to retrospectively, is quite attractive.
3.

Affirmative Action in the Voting Context: Shaw v. Reno

As we saw in the employment context, the Court has ignored the impact of the
present effects of past discrimination and has largely refused to permit racial
preferences to "even the playing field" between racially defined groups. At the
same time, as recent voting rights cases suggest, the Court has also been
extraordinarily sensitive to the "message" sent by governmental race conscious
actions.
At issue in Shaw v. Reno was the constitutionality of two "majority-minority"
congressional districts. North Carolina had drawn the first district after the 1990
census, which entitled it to an additional seat in the U.S. House of
Representatives. 77 Because North Carolina is a "covered jurisdiction" under
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 78 all electoral changes had to be submitted
to the U.S. Attorney General for approval. 79 The Attorney General objected to the
74. See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7 5. See generally Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action,
79 TEX. L. REV. 643 (2000) (discussing the burden some federal courts have placed on defendants in
defending their affirmative action plans to show causation between defendants past discriminatory
conduct and the present effects of that past conduct).
76. Indeed, only Justice Ginsburg has shown the propensity to regularly engage in historical
analysis in the context of affirmative action and school desegregation determinations. See Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
342-43 (2003)(Ginsburg, J., concurring); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 175 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
77. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,633 (1993).
78. Id. at 634.
79. Id. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act also allows covered jurisdictions to seek preclearance
from a three judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (2000).
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state's original plan, and the state passed new legislation to add an additional
majority-minority district.Bo Both districts became the subject of the litigation
which culminated in the Shaw case.
The districts were challenged on the theory that their "dramatically irregular
shape" constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.BI The scope of the
challenge was unusual. Instead of presenting a more typical vote dilution claim,
plaintiffs argued that the redistricting scheme violated their right to participate in
a "colorblind" electoral process.B2 Consequently, there was no argument in the case
that white voters in North Carolina had experienced any diminution in their overall
voting power. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, ruled that the two
districts were so bizarrely shaped as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment.B3 The districts' irregularity sent the unmistakable message that
they were drawn "as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without
regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling
justification." 84
What was the nature of the harm identified by Justice O'Connor? It was not loss
of political power. Instead the harm has been characterized as expressive in
nature. 85 The problem was that the state was expressing an idea through its
redistricting scheme that the Court said was an anathema to the 14th Amendment.
That idea was "political apartheid. " 86 The state sent the impermissible and
inappropriate message by creating two bizarrely shaped majority-minority districts
that "members of the same racial group--regardless of their age, education,
economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. " 87 This message,
which the Court said was grounded in "impermissible racial stereotypes," also
presented a potentially even greater harm,88 which is that such districts with their
message of solid boundaries between racial groups, carried the risk of forever
balkanizing us into "competing racial factions" that "carry us further from the goal
of a political system in which race no longer matters."89
From this perspective, one might see the two bizarrely shaped districts in Shaw
as threats to "colorblindness," which the Court has now said is a constitutional
imperative.90 Shaw suggests that the society we are working toward should be one
where race truly does not matter, such that the government should never take race
into consideration in decisionmaking. As I discuss below, one might understand the
harm in Shaw, sending the message that our society is composed of "competing
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
Rights:
(1993).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635.
Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 641-42.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 642.
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 485
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 657.
See id. at 648-49.
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racial factions," as a threat to at least one conception of integration that was
recognized as a positive social good in Grutter.
Subsequent doctrinal development suggests that the Court has "taken its foot off
the accelerator" to some extent in the voting rights cases. For instance, in Miller
v. Johnson, 91 the Court further clarified the standard from Shmv. As it turned out,
"bizarreness" was not necessarily the touchstone; the real question was whether
"race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a
significant number of voters within or without a particular district." 92 After Miller,
the key seemed to be whether race was a predominant and overriding factor, rather
than merely a consideration in the redistricting process. 93 In evaluating raceconscious districting, the Court would ask: has the legislature subordinated
traditional districting principles to race? 94 As has been noted, this kind of
evaluation maps onto the question of whether a university has used "race as a plus
factor" in admissions determinations. 95
Finally, even more recent voting rights cases suggest that legislatures can take
race into account where race is used instrumentally to achieve other, legitimate
governmental aims. For instance, in Easley v. Cromartie, 96 the Court rnled that
legislatures could use race as a factor in districting where their motivation was
predominantly political as opposed to racial. 97 Thus, "caution is especially
appropriate ... where the state has articulated a legitimate political explanation for
its decision, and the voting population is one in which race and political affiliation
are highly correlated."98 Where it can be shown that black voters consistently vote
for Democrats, it would be appropriate for the legislature to construct heavily black
districts in order to protect incumbents or to achieve other legitimate political
objectives. 99

III.

GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER: THIS GENERATION'S
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION?

The Court in Grutter v. Bollinger reaches a different conclusion with respect to
the propriety of the affirmative action plan challenged than those I have described
above. As I explain, Gruffer is different than those cases because the Court is able
to solve the problem as it defines it, without having to acknowledge some of the
more contested issues that were at the core of the previous cases. Thus, Grutter is
different than the previous affinnative action cases in the employment and voting
rights contexts because both race and the continuing effects of discriminatory
conduct are subordinated and other more general principles are privileged. This is
91. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
92. Id. at 916.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Pamela S. Karlan, Easing The Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the
Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1569, 1598 (2002).
96. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
97. Id. at 239 (citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999)).
98. Id. at 242.
99. See id. at 239.
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consistent with the approach taken in Brown. In this way, Grutter mimics Brown:
both cases seek to solve the extraordinarily difficult racial problem of their era by
articulating the need for integration at a high level of generality, such that many (but
certainly not all) Americans will find it difficult to disagree with the Court's
premise.
At issue in Grutter was the University of Michigan Law School's admissions
policy which used race as a "plus" factor in determining who would be admitted to
the class. 100 The law school's goal was to attain a "critical mass of underrepresented minority students." 101 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, ruled
that the law school's admissions policy, which emphasized a "highly individualized,
holistic review of each applicant's file," did not violate Equal Protection,
notwithstanding the fact that race was likely "outcome determinative" in many
cases. 102
For our purposes, I focus on two aspects of the majority decision that are
particularly pertinent to our discussion of what Brown means today. First, it is
important to describe the nature of the "compelling interest," which the Court
recognized as sufficient to justify the law school's affirmative action plan. The
compelling interest recognized in Grutter, that of "student body diversity" in the
context of higher education, 103 was deeply instrumental. The justification for the
plan was its importance in structuring intergroup relationships prospectively, rather
than addressing harms that had occurred in the past. 104
In Grutter, the problem, as the Court saw it, was the exclusion of many minority
group members from participation in selective educational institutions in the
absence of affirmative action. This was borne out by the Court's decision to defer
to the law school's educational judgment with respect to its admissions process, 105
and its recognition of the link between access to educational opportunity and the
development of a leadership class with "legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry." 106
But it is very important to understand that in upholding the law school's admission
plan, the Court did not do so on the basis of any present or past discriminatory
conduct Grutter, after all, centered on the legitimacy of the "diversity" interest
rather than any argument that the affirmative action plan could be justified as a
remedy for the present effects of past discriminatory conduct. 107 I suggest that the
University of Michigan's affirmative action plan was upheld precisely because it
benefited interests outside those of minority group members.
Contrast this with the Court's approach in the employment cases. Wygant,
Croson, and Adarand all presented the Court with thorny intergroup competition
problems. The underlying problem in those cases was overt and undeniable:
100. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-40 (2003).
101. Id. at 325.
102. Id. at 338-39.
I 03. Id. at 332-33.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 332.
106. Id. at 335. The law school's expert, Dr. Raudenbush, testified.that "a race-blind admissions
system would have a 'very dramatic' negative effect on underrepresented minority admissions." Id.
at 327.
107. See id. at 332-35.
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members of particular ~thnic groups were competing for access to employment
opportunities. While it is true that Grutter also presents a competition problem
(members of a variety of minority groups were "competing" against each other for
entrance into the law school), there was no higher, more "objective" general
principle that could be referred to in the employment context to mediate the conflict
between groups. In the earlier employment cases, the general principle that was
said to justify the use of racial classifications was remediating the present effects
of past discriminatory conduct. 108 But the problem with that general principle is that
it forces the decisionmaker to recognize the extent and nature of racism in American
society and, once that reality has been recognized, to openly "take a side" in a social
and economic contest.
In Grutter, the deeply divisive and enduring social problem was the lack of
sufficient racial diversity in selective educational institutions in the absence of
affirmative action, which has large spillover ramifications. From this perspective,
the law school's affirmative action plan was not an attempt to address racial
inequality, but rather functioned to address the disconnect between white
domination in the corporate, military, and governmental spheres, and the·demands
of an increasingly multicultural society. The law school's interest was sufficiently
compelling because a racially diverse class leads to diversity in other areas of
American society, which ultimately inures to the benefit of everyone. 109 The Court
also recognized that contact among members of different racial groups promotes
"cross-racial understanding" and "helps to break down racial stereotypes." 110 Thus,
the compelling interest recognized in Grutter was the importance of racial
integration broadly defined.
The second aspect of the Court's ruling that deserves mention is the selection
process it favored in seeking to achieve that compelling governmental interest. In
Gratz v. Bollinger, 111 the Court struck down the admissions process used by the
University of Michigan to select undergraduates. 112 The problem with the
undergraduate admissions plan was that it awarded "mechanical, predetermined
diversity 'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity." 113 In contrast, the law school
emphasized individualistic review, flexibility, and competition among all applicants
for admission to the class.11 4 Thus, the process by which the law school chose its
class was consistent with the underlying goal, which was integration defined
broadly. At the same time, the process deemphasized overt, mechanical uses of
race, and favored covert, more subtle uses of racial classifications.
Contrast the law school's process for selecting applicants to the use of race in the
recent voting rights cases. In Shaw, the two districts' "dramatically irregular shape"
sent an overt signal that race was being privileged. 115 That message, from Justice
O'Connor's perspective, was particularly harmful because it had the propensity to
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See infra part 11(1)-(2).
See id. at 333-35.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Id. at 269.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338.
See id. at 337-38.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
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lead to "political apartheid" and Balkanization. 116 Such messages were inconsistent
with a unitary vision of American society. Note, too, Miller v. Johnson, which
suggests that the underlying problem is really the government actor's use of race in
a way in which it predominates over other relevant factors. 117 The use ofrace in
Grutter, on the other hand, resolves the tension suggested in Shaw and Miller. Race
is used "appropriately" in Grutter, meaning in a way that does not predominate over
other relevant factors in the admissions process.
I was sitting on a panel recently, and one of my co-panelists suggested that
Grutter was perhaps a more important decision than Brown. I think that perhaps my
co-panelist's assessment was something of an overstatement, but I would suggest
a refinement to that statement: that Grutter is our generation's Brown. Thus, I do
think it is worth pondering the relationship between the two cases. If the Brown
implementation cases are any guide, there is little reason to expect that the Court's
commitment to affirmative action on the higher education level will be durable.
From this perspective, the twenty-five year "phase-out" should be understood as the
time period during which affirmative action's proponents can reasonably expect to
hold the Court's attention. After that time period has lapsed, one can assume that
the Court will do as it did in Milliken v. Bradley118 (which was decided
approximately twenty-five years after Brown) and shift its attention permanently to
those it believes have been made to pay too high a price in the name of diversity.

116. Id.
117. Millerv. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,920 (1995).
118. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

